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Her eyes, which were grey with a shade of green through them, 
had a habit of glancing upwards when she spoke with anyone, 
which made her look like a little perverse Madonna.
 James Joyce, The Dubliners1
[Dora] remained two hours in front of the Sistine Madonna, rapt 
in silent admiration. When I asked her what had pleased her so 
much about the picture she could find no clear answer to make. 
At last she said: ‘The Madonna’.
 Sigmund Freud, Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria
1. When speaking of Our Lady of Lourdes as an imago, we are obliged 
to shift between theological and aesthetical resonances, thus either 
speaking of an apparition (the ‘Lady’ seen by Bernadette Soubirous 
in 1858) or of a material simulacrum (the iconography of the ‘Lady’ 
as vulgarized by arts and popular imagery). In both cases, as we will 
see, the Lady-imago troubles the viewer, engendering adversarial and 
not easily definable feelings. Through the case study of Our Lady of 
Lourdes, or, more precisely, of a detail of its imago (the upward-look-
ing eyes), my intention here is to draw comparisons and to explore two 
specific aesthetical notions. Although separated by a remarkable histori-
cal distance, they share an analogous aim, namely to render by verbal 
means an undecidability in feeling, experienced in front of an imago.
 The first notion is commonly known as ‘je ne sais quoi’. It first 
emerged in the Renaissance in order to grasp and to define the ‘certain 
1 I especially thank Bruno Besana for having brought this quotation to my atten-
tion. I would also like to thank here all the ICI fellows of the year 2008-09 for 
having variously contributed to the elaboration of the present essay with inspira-
tion, suggestions and advice. Unless otherwise specified, all translations in this 
essay are mine.
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something’ that is neither beautiful nor sublime.2 The other one is the 
‘uncanny’, a word shaped in its modern acceptation around the end of 
the eighteenth century and popularized by the Freudian essay of 1919.3 
These two notions are unknown to classical and medieval aesthetics: 
in this essay, I however argue that both can be understood as meta-
morphoses and after-images of previous conceptualizations that did not 
belong to the domain of aesthetics but rather to that of theology, and 
more generally to that of the sacred. Both the je ne sais quoi and the 
uncanny ground the aesthetical experience in an ambiguous and tensive 
co-existence of different (and often opposite) feelings, thus determining 
a peculiar undecidability in the viewer. The definitions themselves of 
the je ne sais quoi and of the uncanny stress the undecidable nature of 
the aesthetical experiences they aim to denote. While the je ne sais quoi 
eludes its object by denying any positive definition, the uncanny (either 
in the English or in the German form of ‘das Unheimliche’) is articu-
lated on a negative prefix (‘un-’) connected to the roots ‘cunnan’ (Old 
English for ‘to know how to’, ‘to be able to’) or ‘Heim’ (German for 
‘home’), consequently pursuing a double operation. On the one hand, 
the uncanny is not based on a positive definition, but rather on a nega-
tion. On the other hand, we witness the construction of an antinomy 
(possible/impossible, homely/unhomely), which, as Freud highlights, 
leads in the German word Unheimliche to the fusion of the two terms in 
an undecidable hybridism.
 Both notions affirm then that determined aesthetical feelings are 
substantially irreducible to the domain of Logos. They concurrently 
attest to the emergence of a fracture. The je ne sais quoi situates the 
aesthetical jouissance in a liminal zone between harmony (proportio) 
and alterity. While reversing the classical dream of art as the domain 
of ‘measure’ and of pure forms, it questions the utopia of kalokagathìa 
by not solely identifying aesthetic enjoyment with the experiences of 
beauty and of pleasure. Then again, it is worth remarking that the 
Freudian theorizations of the uncanny and of the ‘death-drive’ are basi-
2 For a historical overview of the je ne sais quoi, cf. Paolo D’Angelo and Stefano 
Velotti, Il ‘non so che’: Storia di un’idea estetica (Palermo: Aesthetica, 1997) and 
Richard Scholar, The Je-Ne-Sais-Quoi in Early Modern Europe: Encounters with 
a Certain Something (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
3 I quote from Sigmund Freud, The Uncanny, ed. by David McLintock and Hugh 
Haughton (London: Penguin, 2003). On the concept of the uncanny, cf. Nicholas 
Royle, The Uncanny (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003).
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cally concurrent, moreover sharing an analogous theoretical move. Both 
The Uncanny (1919) and Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920) concur, 
in the end, upon the erosion of the Socratic equation between ‘good’ 
and ‘beautiful’ as the ultimate purposes of the human being. Eventually, 
the two notions locate the ambiguous aesthetic feeling in the troubling 
acknowledgment of an alterity within the image itself. 
 In analyzing both the je ne sais quoi and the uncanny as forms of 
undecidability experienced in front of an imago, I will adopt here this 
last notion in its full semantic medieval extension, inquiring into both 
the je ne sais quoi and the uncanny as after-images if its complex plural-
ity. From this perspective, we can speak of imago as a paragon-figura 
(‘et creavit Deus hominem ad imaginem suam’; ‘So God created man in 
his own image’, Genesis I, 27a), as a material object-simulacrum, and 
eventually as immaterial image-phantasma (dream, ghost, apparition, 
mental image, mirror-reflection).4 Incidentally, I can add that medieval 
psychology (from this perspective, I think, not differently from psycho-
analysis) has given a full account of the interaction between visibilia 
and invisibilia, between mental and carved images, and between illusory 
apparitions and tangible presences: such a conceptual apparatus was, 
however, granted by a paradigmatic structure, namely by a theoretical 
frame determining the conceptual and actual experience of visual con-
templation.5 Equally, despite the lack of such a notion as the uncon-
scious, it defined a horizon of scientific expectation where the inexpli-
cable was indistinctly set under the notions of miraculosum or of dia-
bolicum. I argue that the fall of such a paradigmatic structure (already 
begun, Didi-Huberman argues, in the Renaissance)6 gives birth in post-
Enlightenment times to an ambiguous no man’s land, where superstition 
persists along with experimental science and with such forms of knowl-
4 See Michael Camille, The Gothic Idol: Ideology and the Image-Making (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 43 and Eugenio Burgio, Racconti 
di immagini: Trentotto capitoli sui poteri della rappresentazione nel Medioevo 
occidentale (Alessandria: Edizioni dell’Orso, 2001), pp. 6-7.
5 For the notion of ‘paradigm’ I refer to Giorgio Agamben, Signatura rerum: Sul 
metodo (Turin: Boringhieri, 2008), who discusses its genealogy in Kuhn’s, Can-
guilhem’s and Foucault’s writings.
6 Cf. Georges Didi-Huberman, Fra Angelico: Dissemblance et Figuration (Paris: 
Flammarion, 1990), who underlines how the visual experience reflected in Fra 
Angelico’s paintings, rooted in Aquinas’s theology, is already misunderstood by 
his contemporaries.
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edge as theology, medicine and (para)psychology. From this perspective, 
the uncanny hierophany taking place in 1858 in Lourdes can be seen as 
an eloquent example: arising in a superstitious context, analysed and 
dissected with the cooperation and the conflict of theological, medi-
cal and pseudo-scientific forms of knowledge, the Massabielle Lady is 
placed on an intermediate point between positivism and anti-moder-
nity, as well as between science and the supernatural.7 At the same time, 
as an enigmatic logogriph, it questions the very notion of image and 
its meaning, because it is the ungraspable evidence of an ‘otherness’ in 
which the limits of language and of its (diurnal) logic become evident.
7 On the notion of ‘antimodernity’ see Antoine Compagnon, Les antimodernes de 
Joseph de Maistre à Roland Barthes (Paris: Gallimard, 2005).
The Virgin Appearing to 
Bernadette (devotional image, 
late nineteenth century, France).
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2. The Lady joins her hands and looks up to the sky. The expression 
is not unintentional: ‘Lady’ keeps a feudal and courtly flavour, and, in 
being one of the possible translations of the medieval Occitan Dompna, 
designates something beyond femininity, a space of Otherness.8 The two 
gestures engender what Aby Warburg called a Pathosformel:9 the two 
concurrent movements create a tension, in which a feeling sparkles. The 
Lady’s body stages a rhetorical operation: movements become tropes, 
the image/apparition shows itself as a signifier.
 Still – signifier of what? The meaning (‘le sens’) of images is in 
itself, as Georges Didi-Huberman writes, ‘an interweaving, a perver-
sion’.10 Indeed, it implies the concurrent interaction of at least three par-
adigms: that of semiotics (sema), aesthetics (aesthesis), and the pathetic 
(pathos).11 As a form of extra-verbal communication, gesture (gestus)12 
is the place where these three levels of interpretation interact and col-
lide, a synecdoche through which a ‘scientific method’ (as that of War-
burg or of the young Freud)13 can detect the inner genealogy and the 
manifold declinations of the imago.
 Gestures are however scarcely univocal. Warburg doubtlessly per-
ceived this, while recognizing that the tableaux of the Bilderatlas Mne-
mosyne were fields of forces, where the same Pathosformel could alter-
nately be polarized and de-polarized in binary and opposite directions, 
from the dancing nymph to the head-cutter maenad.14 The same occurs 
in the Lady of the Massabielle grotto, whose nature is equally character-
ized by a peculiar undecidability: her gesture, while alluding to a wide 
iconographic tradition, shows an impalpable ambiguity, somehow shift-
ing between the uncanny and the sacred.
8 Cf. Slavoj Žižek, The Metastases of Enjoyment (London-New York: Verso, 
2005), pp. 89-112.
9 On the notion of Pathosformel, see Georges Didi-Huberman, L’image survivante: 
Histoire de l’art et temps des fantômes selon Aby Warburg (Paris: Les Éditions 
de Minuit, 2002).
10 Georges Didi-Huberman, La pittura incarnata: Saggio sull’immagine vivente 
(Milan: Il Saggiatore, 2008), p. 11.
11 Ibid.
12 On gestus, cf. André Chastel, Le geste dans l’art (Paris: Liana Levi, 2001).
13 See Carlo Ginzburg, ‘Spie: Radici di un paradigma indiziario’, in Il segno dei 
tre: Holmes, Dupin, Peirce, ed. by Umberto Eco and Thomas A. Sebeok (Milan: 
Bompiani, 1983), pp. 95-136 and, for the relationship Warburg-Freud, Didi-
Huberman, L’image survivante, pp. 273-334.
14 Didi-Huberman, L’image survivante, pp. 340-54.
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 From the beginning, the Lourdes apparitions sound ambiguous. In 
his reportage on Lourdes, the Italian writer Mario Soldati wrote that 
the city smelled of spiritualism: rather than the atmosphere of a more 
or less sincere Catholicism, what could be perceived in Lourdes was 
basically the flavour of a mid-nineteenth century supernatural, indefin-
ably welded with positivism.15 Chronology and evidence indeed support 
Soldati’s impression. Having taken place only ten years after the first 
experiments orchestrated by the Fox sisters in the United States (1848), 
the Lourdes apparitions shared much in common with concurrent expe-
riences of spiritualist contact and actually engendered a remarkable 
amount of attention in the spiritualistic press.16 Like a medium, Berna-
dette Soubirous experienced visions in a sort of state of trance and in a 
very similar way to that of the Fox sisters, she acted as an intermediary 
between supernatural manifestations and the community, propitiating 
the evocation through the direction of the rosary.
 Even Bernadette herself experienced a certain feeling of ambiguity, 
as did the community in which she lived. When she saw the appari-
tion for the first time, she thought that it could be an evil spirit: the 
next time, she brought some holy water in order to exorcize the figure.17 
When the apparition did not escape, people guessed that it might have 
been the ghost of a pious, recently deceased lady: both the identification 
with an evil ghost and with the benevolent apparition of a saint-like fig-
ure acted as forms of domestication of the inexplicable.18 It is definitely 
revealing that, in her first depositions, Bernadette referred to the appa-
rition as a ‘damsel’ (‘uo pétito damizélo’), namely the Pyrenean patois 
word for ‘fairy’.19 Until their last talk, Bernadette actually refused to 
admit that the apparition was the Virgin Mary: the apparition had never 
called itself as such, and when asked it had only replied with the famous 
sentence ‘I am the Immaculate Conception’ (‘Que soy era Immaculada 
Councepciou’).
 The apparition was therefore an indefinable creature from the 
beginning. It is revealing, I think, that Bernadette – when asked to name 
15 Mario Soldati, Un viaggio a Lourdes, ed. by Salvatore S. Nigro (Palermo: Selle-
rio, 2006), p. 55.
16 Cf. Ruth Harris, Lourdes: Body and Spirit in the Secular Age (London: Allen 
Lane The Penguin Press, 1999), pp. 59 and 375-76.
17 Ibid., p. 4.
18 Ibid., p. 58.
19 Ibid., pp. 77-78.
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it – chose her definition from the register of folklore: while admitting 
that it ‘looked like’ a girl, she, however, named the apparition with 
a qualification belonging to the ‘little people’, namely to an un-gen-
dered category of creatures, traditionally placed beyond all dichotomies 
adopted in Western Christian culture (man/woman, body/soul, Heaven/
Hell). Even the definition of ‘Immaculate Conception’ contributes to 
the undecidability of the apparition with regard to its nature, as far 
as it denotes a concept and not a specific individuality. In her deposi-
tions, Bernadette usually speaks of the apparition as of Aquerò (‘that 
one’): the nature of the apparition goes beyond any specific qualifica-
tion, becoming an ‘evidence’ which is impossible to completely grasp, if 
not by an elementary, denotative act.
 If Aquerò is indefinable from the point of view of sema, her appari-
tion does not produce different effects from that of aisthesis. In front 
of the apparition, Bernadette experiences an equivocal feeling, ambigu-
ously situated between the uncanny and a devout joy. Later declinations 
of the Lourdes theme in literature (from Zola to Huysmans and even-
tually the erotic quivers of Guido da Verona)20 testify to an analogous 
plurality of possible readings. On the three levels of sema, of aesthesis 
and pathos, Aquerò remains indefinable: despite later interpretations, 
more or less conveyed through the frame of specific modes of knowl-
edge (theological, medical, of spiritualistic) it remains a sign that cannot 
be deciphered.
3. ‘Statue or painting? Dead woman or dream?’ The question posed by 
the young, ill lady in Heine’s Florentine Nights stands as a general alle-
gory of this virgin-like Frauentypus – half-blissful, half-uncanny – which 
seems to haunt post-Enlightenment Europe.21 From miracles that flour-
ished more or less spontaneously during the Napoleonic wars – when 
Mary becomes a Catholic Marianne, a traditionalist and papist icon – 
to the apparitions taking place during the Bourbon Restoration (Rue di 
Bac, La Salette) and eventually to the promulgation of the Immaculate 
20 Zola’s Lourdes dates to 1894, Huysmans’s Les foules de Lourdes to 1906. Guido 
da Verona’s novel is Sciogli la treccia Maria Maddalena (1920), where the main 
character, an aesthete, chooses Lourdes as the location to engender a promiscu-
ous triangle with two dames of the demi-monde.
21 See at least Stéphane Michaud, Muse et madone: Visages de la femme de la Révo-
lution française aux apparitions de Lourdes (Paris: Seuil, 1985).
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Conception dogma in 1854, the image of the Virgin seems to cross such 
central questions of post-Enlightenment thought and sensibility, such as 
those of a quest for an a-theological metaphysics (A.W. Schlegel, Nova-
lis, Zacharias Werner), of visionary aesthetics (Jean Paul, Blake, Nerval) 
and of primitivism in the arts (Wackenroder and Tieck, the Nazarens, 
D.G. Rossetti and the Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood). This happens inde-
pendently from personal religious beliefs, and with equal frequency on 
both sides of the Rhine (although such personalities like Schlegel, Bren-
tano and Werner eventually turn to Catholicism). I will introduce here 
two examples, both taken from the last decade of the eighteenth cen-
tury.
 The first example comes from France. In 1791, Sade publishes 
Justine ou les Malheurs de la vertu, a novel which transforms the tra-
ditional, hagiographic plot of the ‘persecuted girl’ into an apology of 
vice.22 To emblematize the misadventures of his heroine, Sade asked the 
painter Philippe Chéry – whose speciality, before the Revolution, had 
been religious painting – to make a frontispiece staging ‘Virtue’ perse-
cuted by ‘Lust’ and ‘Impiety’ (‘Irréligion’).23 Now, this image has evident 
Marian traits: like Our Lady of Lourdes, she lifts her eyes up to the sky, 
according to the iconography of the Mater Dolorosa (and it is perhaps 
not by chance, we can add, if the snake seems, somehow, to shift under 
the foot of such an Addolorata, as in the most classic of religious icon-
ographies).
 Such an oblique presence of the Virgin is, however, not limited to 
the paratextual dimension of the book. In the middle of the novel, Jus-
tine is imprisoned in a monastery, where libertine monks keep other 
22 The first hint of such an interpretation is in Mario Praz’s 1930 book La carne, 
la morte e il diavolo nella letteratura romantica, ed. by Paola Colaiacomo (Flor-
ence: Sansoni, 1999), p. 103, and has subsequently been elaborated by D’Arco 
Silvio Avalle, ‘Da santa Uliva a Justine’, in Aleksandr N.J. Veselovskij-Sade, La 
fanciulla perseguitata, ed. by d’Arco Silvio Avalle (Milan: Bompiani, 1977), pp. 
7-33.
23 The image is thus explained in some editions. Cf. Marquis de Sade, Oeuvres, 
ed. by Michel Delon, 3 vols (Paris: Gallimard, 1990-98), vol. II, p. 1219 and: 
‘Virtue, between Lust and Impiety. Lust is on the left, disguised as a young man 
whose leg is enclosed by a snake, symbolizing the perpetrator of our evil; with a 
hand she removes the veil of Modesty, which preserved Virtue from the profanes’ 
gaze, and so does with the other, while her right foot directs the fall in which she 
wants her to collapse’ (ibid., p. 124).
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young girls for their pleasure: the monastery is consecrated to Mary, 
and it is said to hold a miraculous simulacrum of the Virgin, which is 
shown every year to pilgrims on Assumption Day.
The great day finally arrived. Would you believe, Madame, to what depths 
of monstrous impiety the friars sank during the festival? They fancied that 
a visible miracle would considerably enhance their good name and conse-
quently dressed Florette, who was the youngest and smallest of us, in all 
the Virgin’s finery, secured her fast around the waist by ropes which could 
not be seen, and ordered her to raise her arms solemnly heavenwards when 
the host was lifted up. Since the unhappy creature was threatened with 
the most cruel treatment if she uttered a single word or failed to carry 
out her role, she performed to the best of her ability and the fraud was 
every whit as successful as could have been wished for. The congregation 
acclaimed a miracle, gave rich offerings to the Virgin, and went away more 
convinced than ever of the mercy of the Heavenly Mother. To crown their 
impiety, the libertines required Florette to appear at supper dressed in the 
costume which had brought her such homage, and each inflamed his odi-
ous desires by subjecting her, she still wearing the same vestments, to his 
lewd whims.24 
This apparition of the Virgin is, in accordance with the Enlightenment 
and with revolutionary propaganda, an act of treachery orchestrated 
by a debauched clergy. I will now compare it with another appari-
tion, completely different with regard to its background and modali-
ties, described six years later in Germany. In 1797, Wilhelm Heinrich 
Wackenroder published the Herzensergießungen eines kunstliebenden 
Klosterbruders in Berlin: the first chapter, titled Raphael’s Vision (Raf-
faels Erscheinung), tells the story of the Madonna Sistina, whose 
image had first been proposed as an artistic paragon in Winckelmann’s 
Gedanken (1755), and that later haunted nineteenth and even twen-
tieth-century aesthetics, from Dostoevsky to Cézanne, from Nietzsche 
and Freud to Dalì.25 Wackenroder quotes a passage from a letter written 
by Raphael to Baldassar Castiglione in 1514, where the painter asserts 
how, ‘essendo carestia di belle donne, io mi servo di certa idea che mi 
viene alla mente’ (‘happening to be dearth of beautiful women, I make 
use of a certain idea coming to my mind’). This passage was certainly 
24 Marquis de Sade, The Misfortunes of Virtue and Other Early Tales, transl. David 
Coward (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 91.
25 Cf. Michele Cometa, Parole che dipingono: Letteratura e cultura visuale tra Set-
tecento e Novecento (Rome: Meltemi, 2004), pp. 121-44.
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influenced by the Greek myth of the painter Zeuxis, who had created a 
paragon of feminine beauty while composing a mental image of the best 
part of the five most beautiful ladies he had seen. Wackenroder’s opera-
tion goes far beyond this. On the one hand, while quoting the passage, 
Wackenroder substitutes the image of the Virgin Mary for the original 
one of the nymph Galatea mentioned by Raphael. On the other hand, 
and more importantly, Wackenroder reads the ‘certain idea coming to 
my mind’ (a classical tradition, popularized by medieval medicine and 
having reverberations in the popular culture of the sixteenth century)26 
as a mystic experience of supernatural revelation. For this purpose, 
Wackenroder invents an unpublished manuscript written by Bramante: 
here, Raphael is said to have always wished to paint the Virgin Mary, 
but to have felt the task much tougher than his forces.
Once, at night, after having prayed to the Virgin in his dream, as it often 
happened to him, he was violently shaken, and suddenly woke up. In the 
dark night his eyes were struck by a clear light, on the wall in front of the 
bed; looking closely, he perceived that the painting of the Madonna that he 
had not yet completed was hanging on the wall, and that now, enlightened 
by a sweetest ray of light, had not only become an accomplished paint-
ing, but looked as if it was alive. The sense of divinity [Göttlichkeit] in 
this painting struck him so much that Raphael burst into tears. The image 
gazed at him with an indescribably sweet expression in the eyes; it seemed 
like she was about to move at any moment, and eventually he happened 
to think that she actually moved. But, which was the most wonderful, it 
seemed to him that this image was precisely the one he had always been 
looking for, although until that moment he had only an obscure and indis-
tinct idea.27 
The image is an answer to the inability of conscious intellect to con-
ceptualize spiritual beauty: still, it is a tautological answer, insofar as it 
is defined by itself, by the mere, actual presence of the painting. While 
re-elaborating Renaissance materials, Wackenroder plausibly makes 
reference to a more ancient tradition, namely that, as Pavel Florenskij 
understood well,28 of acheiropoieta, of ‘icons not made by hands’. Tra-
ditionally considered as painted by St Luke, ‘quia, utpote graecus, in 
26 Lina Bolzoni, La stanza della memoria (Turin: Einaudi, 1995), p. 149.
27 Wilhelm Heinrich Wackenroder and Ludwig Tieck, Herzensergießungen eines 
kunstliebenden Klosterbruders, ed. by Richard Benz (Leipzig: Reclam, 1964), p. 9.
28 Pavel Florenskij, Le porte regali: Saggio sull’icona, ed. by Elémire Zolla (Milan: 
Adelphi, 1972), p. 75n.
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pictoria arte erat praecipuus’ (‘because, being Greek, was particularly 
keen in the art of painting’),29 the acheiropoieta worshipped in medi-
eval Italy were normally Byzantine icons, mythicized because of their 
oriental origin.30 In the Western European Middle Ages, the notion of 
acheiropoieton was constructed in order to articulate the problem of 
painting invisibilia: between the Biblical prohibition of idolatry and the 
necessity of a visual dimension implied by incarnation in Christian the-
ology, acheiropoieta provided an avenue for contextualizing the practice 
of painting itself. In such accounts, the creation of the work of art is 
explained in terms of a supernatural intervention. The structure of the 
miracle, as it can be read in Nicolaus Maniacutius or in a later manu-
script now in the Vatican archives, is not very different from that of 
Wackenroder:
He then took some palm wood, he smoothed it carefully, and he prepared 
it very diligently for the work he had decided upon; but the divine hand 
anticipated human work, and the Master’s care accomplished the task 
before the disciple. Indeed, the rock fallen from the mountain without the 
push of any hand, the one who was conceived in the Mother’s womb with-
out any fleshly desire, wanted to be portrayed in this icon without human 
intervention.31
While the Blessed Virgin was sojourning with the apostles, they decided 
among themselves – because of her beauty and of that one she had given 
birth to – to paint her most admirable visage, and it is said that it had been 
only sketched by the hand of Luke the Evangelist, and that immediately 
after her portrait was found, shining with marvellous beauty not for the 
operation of human hands, but for God’s will.32
29 Nicolaus Maniacutius, Historia Imaginis Salvatoris, twelfth century, quoted in 
Burgio, Racconti di immagini, pp. 96-105, p. 98.
30 Cf. Michele Bacci, Il pennello dell’Evangelista: Storia delle immagini sacre 
attribuite a San Luca (Pisa: ETS, 1998).
31 ‘Assumens igitur palmam summo eam studio complanavit, et ad propositum 
opus idoneam diligentissime praeparavit; sed divina manu[s] humanum praevenit 
stadium, et opus discipuli praesumpsit cura magistris. Nam lapis sine manibus de 
monte praecisus, et sine carnali concupiscentia in Matris ventre conceptus absque 
humano opera in hac tabula voluit figurari […]’ (Burgio, Racconti di immagini, 
p. 98).
32 ‘Cum autem Beata Maria moraretur cum apostolis propter eius, quam peperit, et 
suam pulchritudinem hoc inter se statuerunt, ut depingeretur ammirabilis vultus 
eius, et per manus Lucae evangelistae designatus tantummodo dicitur et postmo-
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What is lacking, contrary to Wackenroder’s text, is any description 
of images, any attempt to render their divine nature: the image is not 
described in any way, and narration is only meant to testify to the 
miraculous happening. An image is something alluding to the divine, 
something ‘that cannot be seen of men’:33 still, the space where the 
divine takes place (in Wackenroder, the life-like features of the image, 
its skin, the sweetness of its eyes) is not defined by any means, and only 
apodictically asserted by the text.
 I therefore argue that, in Wackenroder’s account, a metamorphosis 
has taken place: while the miraculous event has been transferred into 
the domain of a visionary experience, we also witness the theoretical 
attempt to situate divinity in the realm of style. It is in style, in ‘a certain 
something’ belonging to Raphael and to that painting only, that divin-
ity becomes manifest; it is in style that the inanimate, bi-dimensional 
nature of the painting appears to be alive, watching the viewer in the 
very moment that the viewer is watching it.
 With this view in mind, I think the proximity between Sade’s pas-
sage and Wackenroder’s can be individuated. Although quite dissimilar, 
the two images – the young Florette disguised as the Virgin Mary, and 
the Virgin Mary who appears to the painter – are closer than it could 
seem at first glance. Actually, while staging a ‘miraculous’ apparition 
of the Virgin, they both theatricalize the vision, situating it in a specu-
lar dialectic between animate and inanimate, and between artifice and 
illusion. On the one hand Florette, a living being, acts like a tableau 
vivant: immobilized and dressed like a statue, she is obliged to move in 
an automaton-like way, making the ‘uncanny valley’ of a simulacrum 
suddenly come to life. In Wackenroder’s narration, on the other hand, 
a lifeless simulacrum shows lifelike features: a motionless painting gives 
the hint of a movement; the ‘indescribably sweet expression of the eyes’ 
suggests the illusion of life. Both images show a supernatural nature: a 
divinity, however, which is just suggested and drafted, situated beyond 
their nature as simulacra, and precisely derived from their artificiality. 
dum inventa est figura eius ammirabili decore praefulgens non operibus manuum 
carnalium sed Domini iussu’ (ibid, p. 106).
33 Giraldus from Barri’s Speculum Ecclesiae tells the story of another acheiropoi-
eton. ‘Quam cum papa quidam, ut fertur, inspicere praesumpsisset, statim lumen 
oculorum admisit’ (‘It is said that a certain pope, who had the presumption of 
watching it directly, lost his sight’, ibid., p. 77).
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The Sistine Madonna is divine because it is a painting, a work of art so 
perfect that it gives the impression of life; Florette is divine because of 
the masquerade, an artificiality projecting on her the looks of an icon. 
Both, in other words, show a glimpse of divinity in the undecidability 
about their nature, felt by Raphael and by the pilgrims but also by the 
monks of Sainte-Marie-des-Bois, whose ‘impiety’ is precisely excited by 
the identification artificially created between the real Florette and the 
Virgin Mary she performs. Artistic creation, religious faith and erotic 
excitement are articulated around the same illusion: as a fetish-object, 
the image alludes to an inaccessible otherness, be it ‘spiritual beauty’, 
‘heavenly mother’ or inaccessible purity. From this point of view, Pierre 
Klossowski was right: adoration and blasphemy, sadism and courtly 
love are expressions of the same tension longing for the unattainable.34
4. It is in the detail, Warburg said, that God is hidden. In the same 
way, both Raphael’s Madonna and Florette show their divine nature 
in details, in glimpses of otherness suddenly appearing on the surface 
of the artificiality they are made of. Georges Didi-Huberman speaks of 
a ‘luminosity’ dangerously attracting the view: ‘in the moment when 
what shines becomes beauty, the luminous spot globally influences our 
relationship with the object’, be it the shining surface of a mirror (like 
in the myth of Narcissus), an aquatic depth (the privileged place for the 
epiphanies of nymphs)35 or the games of correspondence created around 
human skin, marbles and coloured stones in medieval and Renaissance 
art.36 Freud’s Dora, Didi-Huberman recalls, was precisely attracted by 
the ‘enchanting whiteness’ of Lady K.’s body, ambiguously melted with 
34 See Pierre Klossowski, Sade mon prochain (Paris: Seuil, 1947), p. 148: ‘Casting 
doubt on the virgin, on the religious idea of virginity, has nothing surprising in 
a materialist and anti-Christian time: virginity appears then, to an unbeliever, as 
a state as absurd as that of marital faithfulness. Sade’s soul aspires however to 
purity and faithfulness inasmuch as they have become incomprehensible aims. 
Sade’s entire oeuvre seems to be nothing else than a lonely, desperate cry directed 
towards inaccessible purity; a cry covered and kind of set in a canticle of blas-
phemies. I am excluded from purity since I want to possess her who is pure. I 
cannot desire purity, but at the same time I am impure since I want to enjoy the 
unenjoyable purity.’ The chapter where this passage is included was suppressed 
by Klossowski in the second edition of the book, published in 1967.
35 See Roberto Calasso, La letteratura e gli dèi (Milan: Adelphi, 2001), p. 37 and 
La follia che viene dalle ninfe (Milan: Adelphi, 2005), p. 32.
36 Didi-Huberman, Fra Angelico and La pittura incarnata, p. 74.
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that of Raphael’s Sistine Madonna, which she had seen in Dresden: the 
‘shining’ perceived in painted, sculpted, imagined bodies is the sign of 
an otherness, of the belonging of image to another order of reality. 
 The Greeks indicated such a concept with the word Charis. Charis 
is a mythological and aesthetic notion: it eventually passed to the 
domain of Christian theology, where, opposed to Eros, it signals a spir-
itual and non-carnal love.37 Where Charis is, where something shines, 
divinity can be perceived: it is a lightness, a breeze, a glimpse of other-
ness troubling a given context, the same otherness perceived by War-
burg in the Ghirlandaio ‘nymph’, destabilizing with her pagan and airy 
gestus the Christian-medieval gravity of the painting. The Latin transla-
tion of Charis is gratia, and gratia is precisely, in theology as well as in 
artistic theory, the notion invoked in order to speak (and to render visu-
ally) the beauty of the Virgin Mary.
 The medieval debate around this concept is very wide, and I will 
only make here a quick overview. It is approximately in the twelfth cen-
tury (and mainly through the theology developed in Cistercian environ-
ments) that the Virgin Mary, gratia plena, starts to embody and unify 
both the meanings of the word gratia, both as spiritual pureness and 
as aesthetic nobility. In Rupert of Deutz’s commentary on the Song of 
Songs, in Honorius Augustodunensis’s Sigillum Mariae and in Bernard 
of Clairvaux’s sermons, Mary’s purity is strictly connected with her 
beauty, both derived from her plenitude of grace. It is, however, only 
in Baldwin of Exeter’s Tractatus septimus de salutatione angelica, com-
posed in the late twelfth century, that grace is identified with something 
situated beyond beauty and beyond the elements which traditionally 
constituted it (proportio and claritas). Grace is something that shines in 
proportions, but is not identified with them: otherwise, Baldwin argues, 
how could evil people possibly be beautiful? Grace must, therefore, be 
something else: it derives from an inner, spiritual beauty, reflected in the 
luminosity of skin as a symbol for virginity, and in the chaste flush of 
37 On the Greek notion of Charis, see Karl Deichgräber, Charis und Chariten, Gra-
zie und Grazien (München: Ernst Heimeran, 1971) and Bonnie MacLachlan, 
The Age of Grace (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). On the etymol-
ogy and the uses of Latin gratia, cf. Claude Moussy, Gratia et sa famille (Paris: 
Presses Universitaires de France, 1966). On the genealogy leading from Greek 
Charis to spiritual love and to gratia as a theological and aesthetical notion, see 
Martino Rossi Monti, Il cielo in terra: La grazia fra teologia ed estetica (Torino: 
UTET, 2008).
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the visage as a sign for modesty. At its greatest, writes Baldwin, grace 
is manifest in eyes: if eyes are speculum animae, and at the same time a 
feature of aesthetic beauty, it is in eyes that the two notions of spiritual 
Charis and of aesthetic gratia are evident and harmonized.38 If on the 
one hand grace is something impalpable, irreducible to any aesthetic 
canon, on the other hand we witness a very precise constellation of the 
areas of the body where grace becomes evident: skin and eyes, namely 
(transferring our analysis to the domain of art) those details where the 
ability of the painter is most at stake, where the painting can give the 
mimetic impression of being alive.
 This theological overview allows us to perceive better what happens 
to grace with the decay of medieval paradigms of visual experience. 
The problem of aesthetic grace is widely debated in the Renaissance 
and symptomatically connected to Raphael as the painter of grace par 
excellence. It is in this environment that the notion of grace is gradu-
ally turned into that of the je ne sais quoi, in order to define ‘an unsaid’ 
of images which cannot be reduced to aesthetic alchemies. Raphael is, 
from this point of view, a paradigmatic painter. One of the first attes-
tations of the je ne sais quoi, the Italian expression ‘non so che’, is to 
be found precisely in relation to Raphael, in Lodovico Dolce’s Dialogo 
della pittura (1557):
Raphael was said to be gracious because, apart from cleverness [invenzi-
one], organization [disegno] and variety, and apart from the fact that all 
his works excite feelings at the most [movono sommamente], one can find 
in them that element [parte] which, as Pliny writes, Apelles’s figures pos-
sessed: which is beauty [venustà], namely that a certain something which 
pleases so much either in painters or in poets, filling the soul with a pleas-
ure that is so infinite insofar as we do not know from where the element 
pleasing us so much emerges [non sapendo da qual parte esca quello che a 
noi tanto piace].39
It is impossible to reconstruct here the wanderings of the je ne sais quoi 
as a notion. Still, by aiming to replace the theological gratia, it attempts 
to convey ‘an unsaid’ of visuality, a space that – as the definition implic-
itly admits – remains untold and indeterminate. This space is that of an 
elided sacred, the Charis connected by the Greeks with the subtle pres-
ence of nymphs or the plenitude of gratia reflected in the Virgin Mary’s 
38 Rossi Monti, Il cielo in terra, pp. 62-73.
39 Quoted in ibid., pp. 142-45 and 150.
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eyes and skin. The result is a swerve, a metamorphosis: the medieval 
notion of acheiropoieton becomes, as in Wackenroder, a visionary and 
mystic experience; miraculous images become a hoax orchestrated by 
impious monks; the gratia unifying spiritual and physical beauty in the 
visage of Mary becomes the virgin-like appearance inspiring the lubri-
cous desire of libertines. The je ne sais quoi, as an a-theological defi-
nition, emerges precisely when the paradigmatic frame sustaining the 
notion of Charis/gratia has decayed: placing an undefined otherness 
where the divine was, it alludes to a ‘beyond’ without defining its bor-
ders and nature. In parallel, the je ne sais quoi denotes a destabiliz-
ing experience: the figural relationship through which Florette becomes 
the Virgin Mary, to the monks’ eyes, is a moment in which the Ego 
is no longer master in its own house, when illusions suddenly become 
true, thus destabilizing the subject. Like the je ne sais quoi, this feeling 
also arises from surprise: from the sudden acknowledgment, in other 
words, that what we don’t believe (anymore) can still, despite every-
thing, become manifest in front of our eyes.
5. Like the je ne sais quoi, the uncanny too is a relatively new aesthetic 
notion: vaguely circulating in Romantic aesthetics, it is defined in the 
environment of early twentieth-century psychoanalysis, first by Ernst 
Jentsch and then, in 1919, by Sigmund Freud. As in the case of the je 
ne sais quoi, the uncanny is rooted in a sort of undecidability: both 
Jentsch and Freud seem quite aware of a peculiar prominence of subjec-
tivity in uncanny feeling, determining a remarkable difficulty in giving 
an unitary definition. Freud notes that ‘people differ greatly in their 
sensitivity to this kind of feeling’, adding that he himself ‘must plead 
guilty to exceptional obtuseness in this regard, when great delicacy of 
feeling would be more appropriate’.40 This statement is extremely inter-
esting for two reasons. First of all, because of its literary implications: 
it is well known, indeed, that a subjective point of view, either in the 
form of a first-person narrative (as in Henry James’s The Turn of the 
Screw) or of an inner monologue (as in Shirley Jackson’s The Haunting 
of Hill House) is a literary technique widely used in so-called ‘fantastic 
literature’, a genre in which the undecidability between the rational and 
supernatural explication of events is a strongly constitutive element.41 
40 Freud, The Uncanny, p. 124.
41 Cf. the famous notion of the ‘fantastic tale’ elaborated by Tzvetan Todorov, 
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This establishes a connection between psychoanalysis and fantastic lit-
erature, not only in the sense defined by Freud (namely, that writers 
have often anticipated psychoanalytic discoveries), but also from the 
point of view of writing techniques. If Freud’s clinical essays are writ-
ten, as it has been often stated,42 with the structure of crime and mys-
tery stories, patients’ speeches (as well as the suspense created by Freud 
in articulating his writings) often create a peculiar feeling of ambigu-
ity, which is precisely grounded on subjectivity and on a contamina-
tion between supernatural and rationalistic instances. And if fantastic 
literature stages ‘after-images’ of a ‘traditional’ supernatural, marked by 
post-Enlightenment disenchantment and by a tension between ‘natural’ 
and ‘supernatural’ explanations, psychoanalysis – according to an elo-
quent passage of The Uncanny – does not act otherwise. ‘The Middle 
Ages’, writes Freud, ‘attributed all these manifestations of sickness […] 
to the influence of demons’: he would not be surprised ‘to hear that 
psychoanalysis, which seeks to uncover these secret forces, [has] for this 
reason itself come to seem uncanny to many people’.43 
 What matters here, however, is the ‘delicacy’ evoked by Freud. 
Already in Jentsch the uncanny was characterized by a peculiarly float-
ing nature: for very similar reasons, Freud turned to Daniel Sanders’s 
dictionary, to Schelling’s famous quotation (that the uncanny is ‘alles, 
was ein Geheimnis, im Verborgenen bleiben sollte und hervorgetreten 
ist’, ‘the name for everything that ought to have remained secret and 
hidden but has come to light’)44 and eventually to E.T.A. Hoffmann. 
Dictionary definitions and literary examples helped in grasping the 
nature of what is ‘frightening […] what evokes fear and dread’45 (but 
is neither the one nor the other), of what ‘commonly merges with what 
arouses fear in general’46 (but is not fear), of something which ‘is not 
Introduction à la littérature fantastique (Paris: Seuil, 1970), and the consid-
eration on first-person narrative and fantastic literature made by Francesco 
Orlando, ‘Forms of the Supernatural in Narrative’, in The Novel, ed. by Franco 
Moretti, 2 vols (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), II, pp. 207-43 
(p. 232).
42 For example by Mario Lavagetto, Freud, la letteratura e altro (Turin: Einaudi, 
2001).
43 Freud, The Uncanny, p. 150.
44 Ibid., p. 132.
45 Ibid., p. 123.
46 Ibid.
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always used in a clearly definable sense’ but has a specificity, a ‘com-
mon nucleus’, concludes Freud, ‘which allows us to distinguish the 
“uncanny” within the field of the frightening’.47
 As an aesthetic category, the uncanny is therefore something that 
exists but cannot be defined: denotation is systematically deferred, 
masked and enveloped by the staging of several rhetorical strategies 
– periphrases, litotes, oxymora, and eventually tautologies (‘uncanny 
is what is felt to be uncanny’). Such undecidability, as we have seen, is 
incorporated even within the word itself. The undecidability between 
‘troubling familiarity’ and ‘familiar troubling’ is situated within Freud’s 
etymological turn in the pair Heimliche/Unheimliche, meant as a binary 
opposition, an affirmation/negation co-existing in the same word: the 
interchangeability between the two signifiers, both denoting either the 
one or the other meaning, delineates a tensive core around which the 
double sign (Un)heimliche, like a Warburgian Pathosformel, is alter-
nately polarized and de-polarized. 
 According to Freud, such duality is a peculiarity of the unconscious. 
In the Interpretation of Dreams, he notes that dream logic seems to 
ignore the Aristotelian principle of contradiction: while diurnal, a-sym- 
metric logic does not admit that two contradictory statements can be 
true at the same time, that of dreams tends to incorporate binary oppo-
sitions in double and alternate signs. Then, in an article of 1910, Freud 
comes back to the same topic, noting that the same phenomenon could 
be retraced in ‘primal’ languages, where it often happened that the same 
linguistic sign could denote antithetic terms: this confirmed, in Freud’s 
opinion, the ‘archaic regressive character of thought expression in 
dreams’.48 
 Ambiguity and undecidability signal, as in the relationship gratia/je 
ne sais quoi, the presence of a culturally repressed sacred element: the 
duality of (Un)heimliche is implicitly seen as the residue of a magical-
ritual conception of the world, either belonging to ‘archaic’ times (what 
Freud, in The Uncanny, called ‘animism’) or to the time of an equally 
animist ‘infantile omnipotence’. The word (Un)heimliche itself is there-
fore a Nachleben der Antike: the residue of a symmetric logic which 
has become inaccessible to the adult or to the ‘civilized’ individual 
47 Ibid.
48 Sigmund Freud, ‘The Antithetical Meaning of Primal Words’, in The Standard 
Edition, ed. by James Strachey, 24 vols (London: Vintage, 2001), XI, pp. 155-61.
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except in the domain of dreams, and even more eloquent insofar as the 
word (Un)heimliche shows, incorporated within, the very mechanics of 
(dis)enchantment. From this perspective, the uncanny is an after-image 
of the sacred, the sign of the absence of metaphysics, which cannot ever 
grasp its object precisely because such an object is lacking.
 The uncanny is therefore a form of the je ne sais quoi, whose out-
come is not, we might say, a troubling pleasure, but rather a pleasing 
trouble: in the same way as the eighteenth-century je ne sais quoi ques-
tioned the monolithic fixedness of classical beauty through an impal-
pable alterity perceived in irregularity, the uncanny finds a familiarity 
in the irremediable alterity that causes fear. In an ideal scale between 
beauty and horror as absolute forms of ‘otherness’, the je ne sais quoi 
and the uncanny would hence meet somewhere in the middle, between 
pleasure and trouble: their space is that of an allusive and unfamiliar 
otherness, made evident in the perimeters of simplicity and of famili-
arity. In other words, both show unexpectedness in the expected: as 
intruders in the House, both the je ne sais quoi and the uncanny insinu-
ate a doubt, thus opening a window to alterity.
6. Let us go back to the apparition of Our Lady of Lourdes. The Lady, 
we said, looks upward to the sky, as in Chéry’s engraving. There, eye 
movement served as an emblem of the ‘misadventures of virtue’: here, it 
alludes to the celestial nature of the apparition. Is it only this?
 We find an analogue expression, twenty years after the apparitions, 
in the Iconographie photographique de la Salpêtrière (1878). The photo 
is a picture of Augustine, the most photographed of Charcot’s patients, 
and it is classified among the ‘attitudes passionnelles’ as ‘ecstasy’ 
(‘extase’).49 Charcot himself, in 1887, published Les démoniaques dans 
l’art, where experiences of mystical ecstasy or diabolical possession 
– taken from medieval and early modern pictures – were considered 
as manifestations of psychical illnesses and thus explained. Charcot’s 
operation, however, was ambiguous: first of all because the ideas of 
ecstasy and of possession, rather than explained by medical interpre-
tation, actually came to haunt clinical portraits (in the same way as 
psychoanalysis itself, as Freud would have recognized, would become 
49 See Georges Didi-Huberman, Invention of Hysteria: Charcot and the Photo-
graphic Iconography of the Salpêtrière, transl. by Alisa Hartz (Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 2003), p. 146.
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uncanny for many people). ‘They invoked religious ecstasy to explain 
hysterical ecstasy,’ writes Didi-Huberman, ‘and in return explained reli-
gious ecstasy, its stigmata of all kinds and its whole story, as the hys-
terical manifestations of pure erotic deliria’.50 The short circuit created 
by the juxtaposition of religious ecstasy and of its medicalization left 
the visible and symptomatic manifestations of ecstasy to solely epito-
mize themselves. Like Warburg, Charcot chose to explain images with 
images: again, interpretation was entrapped in the aporia of the incom-
municable situated beyond images. The hysterical symptom itself, as 
Freud would have acknowledged, ‘makes use of images and attitudes 
[…] because hysteria itself behaves […] like an image, an image of 
memory. The symptom […] is like a symbol’.51 From this perspective, 
psychoanalysis is an experience of image-reading, the impossible task of 
reducing imagines to the domain of Logos.
 In pursuing this task, the analysis is trapped in the impossibility of 
completely grasping its object, and therefore to recur to negation in 
order to embody ambiguous feelings (‘je ne sais quoi’, ‘Unheimliche’, 
‘Uncanny’). While attempting to grasp a glimpse of divinity in an 
earthly imago (the je ne sais quoi as an afterimage of gratia) or to 
understand the troubling otherness of a presumed familiarity (the 
uncanny), the subject is caught within a choice. This choice is the vel 
evoked by Lacan in seminar XI, in which, ‘whatever choice one makes, 
the consequence is a neither the one, nor the other’:52 in our case, we 
should better speak of both the one and the other, the two terms of the 
antinomy (divine/human, familiar/alien) welded in an enigmatic unity.
 Thus, the image of the ‘Lady’s body – ‘culturally constructed as 
the superlative site of alterity’53 – stands as the privileged medium for 
emblematizing such a unity. In the imago, not unlike the relationship 
of courtly love (another game of image manipulation), the subject con-
templates a glimpse of otherness, which, in an age of disenchantment, 
with the lack of any paradigmatic structure guaranteeing the nature of 
what we are watching, cannot engender but an ambiguous feeling. Eyes 
50 Ibid., p. 148.
51 Ibid., p. 159.
52 Jacques Lacan, Le Séminaire livre XI: Le quatre concepts fondamentaux de la 
psychanalyse 1964, ed. by Jacques-Alain Miller (Paris: Seuil, 1973), p. 191.
53 Elisabeth Bronfen, Over Her Dead Body: Death, Femininity and the Aesthetic 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992), p. xi.
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looking upwards (where Charis once glimpsed) can equally be those of 
the Virgin Mary, of persecuted virtue, of Bernadette, of Augustine or 
of a medium; they can symbolize ecstasy, orgasm, agony, spiritualistic 
trance; they can be equally blissful, uncanny, deathly or gracious. The 
oblique gaze of the painting reverberates in that of the viewer, in the 
undecidability of the viewer’s feeling.
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